The Danish election on 18 June 2015 was a tight affair with the centre-right bloc winning 90 seats to the incumbent centre-left’s 89. The centre-right (consisting of the Liberals, the Conservatives, Liberal Alliance and the populist Danish People’s Party (DPP)) will therefore form a parliamentary majority with the Liberals’ leader (and Prime Minister from 2009-11) Lars Løkke Rasmussen as Prime Minister. After fraught post-election negotiations, Mr Rasmussen decided to eschew formal coalition partners; the new government therefore has one of the lowest popular mandates in history.

 

The internal results within the centre-right bloc were fascinating with the DPP vote surging to 21% and the Liberals vote slumping to under 20%. Meanwhile, the Conservatives, with under 4%, continued their desperate downwards spiral.

 

Below are five talking points from the election.

 

  1. Will Mr Rasmussen Have a Legitimacy Problem?

 

Danish politics used to be simple. Parties would indicate which of the blocs (red or blue) they intended to join; the electorate voted; and the leader of the biggest party in the winning bloc became Prime Minister. The Liberals came in third in the election, behind their allies in the DPP. Why, given this fact, is Mr Rasmussen the new Prime Minister?

 

The simple answer is the centre-right expected the Liberals to be the largest party and therefore anointed Mr Ramsussen as their Prime Minster candidate prior to the election. Having campaigned on this platform, they could not suddenly move the goalposts. There is a more subtle answer as well though. The DPP (Eurosceptic and anti-immigration) have, in the last decade, become a more mature party, and have been accepted into mainstream politics, but they remain controversial to many voters.

 

Added to this, they seem reluctant to take the reins of power themselves. Their tactically astute leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, argues that he has more policy leverage by staying out of a formal coalition agreement; critics reply that he is simply avoiding responsibility and wanting to claim credit for the government’s popular initiatives whilst ducking the tough calls.

 

Either way, the fact is the Liberals control less than a fifth of the Parliament. Finding common ground with other parties will be time consuming and involve tough and complex negotiations. There will be times when the government’s very existence will come under pressure and some commentators expect it to last only a couple of years. That others think it has a chance is down to Mr Rasmussen’s skills as a political operator behind the scenes. Cajoling colleagues and allies; finding common ground where little exists; and surviving when the pressure is on are his strengths. He will need to exhibit them regularly in the months and years ahead.

 

 

  1. What Fiscal Policies Will be Pursued?

 

Denmark’s strict proportional representation means that governments almost always need to pay heed to three or four parties. The previous Social Democrat government had support parties ranging from the hard left Red-Green Alliance (who appoint a political spokesperson rather than a leader because they do not believe in party hierarchy) to the free market Social Liberals.

 

Rarely, though, has there been as big a difference in economic policies within a bloc than with the DPP and the libertarian Liberal Alliance. DPP may be on the right on values issues like immigration and the EU, but they are fundamentally statist. Liberal Alliance want a more streamlined public sector with significant income and corporation tax cuts. The DPP might be persuaded to agree to cuts at the lower income tax rate, which would benefit their typical voter profile. Liberal Alliance, though, also want the top rate abolished and that is anathema to the DPP.

 

Trying to broker a compromise the Liberals have proposed a long-term aim of a 5% cut in top rate. However, with the DPP having already laid down a marker that this is unacceptable, it will be tough to get through. The big worry is, though, that this is just the thin end of the wedge and internal squabbling about tax breaks will be standard fare in the coming years. Mr Rasmussen will need to constantly find new ways to broker a compromise on fiscal matters.

 

  1. David Cameron Gains a Vital Ally

 

Not since Birgitte Nyborg (from Borgen) faced the electorate, has a Danish election been followed as closely in the United Kingdom (UK). Prime Minister David Cameron is on the lookout for new allies in his tricky mission to renegotiate the UK’s position within the European Union (EU), and one has just fallen into his lap.

 

The DPP have toned down their rhetoric about wanting Denmark to leave the EU in recent years, instead focusing on a multi-speed Europe where countries can pick and choose certain areas to co-operate. They are still, though, avowedly Eurosceptic. When Mr Cameron won re-election in May they could hardly hide their delight that the whole EU system was open for debate. Immediately they called for others to ride in Mr Cameron’s slipstream and, to combat concerns about benefit tourism, the four centre-right parties issued a joint declaration in the election campaign. They would support Mr Cameron in his re-negotiation bid with particular emphasis on restraints for welfare benefits for migrant workers. “We want a Europe where workers move freely where the demand is, not where the social benefits are best” explained Mr Rasmussen.

 

Of course the centre-right are, principally, using Mr Cameron’s campaign to their own ends. Denmark has one of the more generous welfare systems, and the government will get further in promoting change by piggy-backing off one of the largest members. But commonality of interest can be a powerful force in politics and the new government is clearly Mr Cameron’s first definite ally. And for all the military planning of his recent charm offensive, they came about by the sheer good fortune of Danish domestic politics!

 

 

  1. Personnel Change for the Social Democrats

 

Social Democrats viewed Helle Thorning-Schmidt with a degree of suspicion for most of her ten year career as leader. A stylish polyglot, Ms Thorning-Schmidt is a far cry from an old fashioned Social Democratic politician. In addition, she lacked a base in the party, having come straight from the European Parliament into the leader’s role. The party grew to like her in recent times though, as she doggedly worked away at the Prime Minister’s office and threw her heart and soul into the recent campaign.

 

Whether Ms Thorning-Schmidt could have stayed on after losing is a moot point. At only 49 she had time on her side but, after four years as Prime Minister, a spell in opposition held little appeal. With a little emotion and her customary professionalism, she announced she would stand down straight after the results were announced.

 

Her immediate role will be as an ordinary opposition backbencher, where she will be able to enjoy a more modest workload than in the last decade. After that global opportunities will surely open. Ms Thorning-Schmidt has a wide range of international contacts from both her own career and her husband’s family (her father-in-law is Neil Kinnock, former UK Labour party leader and European Commissioner). With international organisations keen to appoint talented women, Ms Thorning-Schmidt’s excellent English and top-level experience will make her an obvious contender for major jobs.

 

Back in Denmark, the leader’s baton has passed to 37-year old Mette Frederiksen. She is a more traditional Social Democratic figure, having been active in the party since her teenage years. She has a strong base in the party and has been a vocal opponent of increasing inequality. Whether an alteration of policy will follow the change of rhetoric is though another matter; over the last 20 years the Social Democrats have pursued modest, business friendly policies and this direction is so well ingrained it is unlikely to change much.

 

 

  1. Denmark Has a West Lothian Question too

 

The end result of the election was 90 seats to the centre-right and 89 seats to the centre-left, with the centre-left winning all four seats representing Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Both areas are, largely, autonomous with day-to-day decisions being made locally. Copenhagen’s influence is little more than sending an annual block grant and having the final say on Foreign Affairs and Defence. On the other hand, the four “North Atlantic mandates” have the same voting powers as all other Parliament members. If around 20,000 Danish voters had voted differently (as some opinion polls had suggested), Ms Thorning-Schmidt would have remained as Prime Minister despite the centre-right winning a majority in mainland Denmark.

 

This type of constitutional anomaly is so well known in the UK that it even has a name; “The West Lothian Question” named after the Scottish constituency of the MP who raised the issue in when devolution to Scotland (and Wales) was first seriously discussed in the late 1970s. In short, is it fair that Scottish MPs vote on all matters in London if significant decision making powers are devolved to Edinburgh?

 

The question was dormant through most of the 1980s and 1990s as the Conservatives refused to even countenance devolution. After that it simmered from the late 1990s when a Scottish Parliament (and Welsh Assembly) was introduced, before boiling over in the last year thanks to the remarkable surge of the pro-independence Scottish National Party (SNP’). With the (British) Conservatives’ recent election campaign floundering, concern about the SNP having a controlling say in Britain’s asymmetric constitution, became their trump card.

 

The issue of the North Atlantic mandates was not as furiously debated in this election. It did, though, come up occasionally and the principle is the same. This election is not the only time that the North Atlantic mandates have come close to being a deciding factor; in 1998 the Liberals would have come to power if fewer than 200 Faroese had voted a different way.

 

With Danish elections habitually close, it is surely only a matter of time before a bloc comes to power on the back of the North Atlantic mandates. At that point, obvious questions will be asked about a government’s legitimacy if they propose radical changes to, say, the school system based on Greenlandic and Faroese votes. Rather than dismissing this year’s election as a close shave, politicians should debate this anomaly in the open before it inevitably boils over. It is not an easy problem to solve. However, even the open and knowing acceptance that the current anomaly has its constitutional reasons would make it less toxic when the inevitable occurs.

Neil Smith